After the Christchurch Tragedy
Nazarbayev’s plans; North Korea’s satellite ambitions; a post-INF world
The Big One.
Preventing the next Christchurch massacre.
The worst terror attack in New Zealand’s history took place on March 15, 2019, when 50 people were killed and another 50 injured across two mosques in Christchurch. The terrorist attacker, a self-described white supremacist from Australia, published a manifesto ahead of the attack that made a political motive for the attacks clear. He was captured alive by New Zealand police. The victims of the shooting represented all portions of the diverse tapestry of the Christchurch Muslim community, including individuals of South and Southeast Asian origin.
New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern and her cabinet sprung into action in the aftermath of the attack, promising first to change the country’s laws on the private ownership of semi-automatic weapons of the kind that were used by the gunman. Ardern has received global praise additionally for her messages promoting national unity and identifying the country’s Muslim community as inherently New Zealanders.
Distressingly, however, the Christchurch terror attack has raised serious concerns about the growing networked nature of global white supremacy. The Christchurch terrorist cited Anders Breivik, the Norwegian mass shooter who killed 77 people in 2011. He also cited Dylann Roof, an American white nationalist who killed churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015. His radicalization appeared to have occurred on online message boards well-known to be associated with white supremacist thought, too.
As Rodger Shanahan has written at the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, Christchurch should prompt a moment of reflection about the growing global nature of white nationalist violence—particularly in Australia and New Zealand. There are serious questions about the extent to which intelligence assets—particularly within the Five Eyes group of countries to which New Zealand and Australia belong, along with the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada—should be reallocated to better understanding violent white supremacist activities online. Ardern herself, in the aftermath of the shooting, said: “This individual should have been someone that the authorities were aware of and were proactively already focused on.” (See also recent writing by Van Jackson on this final point.)
Both Australia and New Zealand have dealt with their share of exclusionary immigration laws in the past and it’s clear that the relationship between white supremacist politics in either country will have a bearing on their relationships with Asian countries. Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim country, summoned the Australian ambassador just days after the Christchurch terror attack to answer for comments made by ultra-right-wing Australian Senator Fraser Anning blaming New Zealand’s immigration policies for the massacre. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison condemned Anning, noting that his “views had no place in Australia, let alone in the Australian parliament.”
Bottom Line: After the Christchurch massacre, it’s time for the Five Eyes countries to take the threat of violent white supremacist violence seriously.
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East Asia.
After the U.S.-North Korea diplomatic collapse in Hanoi, Vietnam, at the end of February, things have been awfully quiet between the two sides. Last time, I discussed the reasons the talks collapsed. Since then, evidence has accrued that North Korea may be moving toward depriving U.S. President Donald J. Trump of the concession that’s most precious to him: a lack of missile launch activity.
To be clear, North Korea is probably not about to launch a missile. What it may do, however, is send up a satellite. Trump noted in Hanoi that Kim had given him an assurance that there’d be no more missile or nuclear tests, but it remains to be seen if the North Korean leader shares the interpretation that satellite launches count as missile launches. (My hunch is no given North Korea’s long-standing insistence on space activities as purely civilian and the very public collapse of the 2012 Leap Day Agreement over this precise issue.)
In any case, I decided earlier this month to compile the sum total of what I know regarding indicators that Pyongyang might be setting up a satellite launch—either to go through with it or to engage in coercive diplomacy with the United States. There’s a fair bit to go on—from reported and open source evidence from 2017 about new satellites in development, to intelligence reports in 2018 regarding new, large rocket boosters in production, and, finally, of course, the very recent 2019 activity.
Either way, don’t say you were surprised if and when North Korea does confirm a planned satellite launch. If that does happen, I suspect this round of U.S.-North Korea diplomacy will come to an end. Hopefully it has a soft landing and we don’t return to the days of “fire and fury” from 2017.
Bottom Line: There are several indicators that a North Korean satellite launch could take place.
Don’t Miss It: The Diplomat’s editor-in-chief, Shannon Tiezzi, spoke to Yukon Huang, a senior fellow with the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, about China’s new foreign investment law. Read the interview here.
South Asia.
The February crisis between India and Pakistan has slowly cooled after it threatened to explode into an all-out hot war. India chose not to escalate following Pakistan’s air strikes in retaliation to its own February 26 strikes on a Jaish-e-Mohammed complex at Balakot, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
In the weeks since the start of the crisis, some diplomatic normalcy has resumed too. An important litmus test for the state of bilateral ties was the state of the Kartarpur corridor dialogue, which, before the Balakot strikes and the Pulwama attack, represented an important area for bilateral confidence-building on a narrow issue. On March 14, delegations from the two sides met to discuss the issue. The Diplomat’s Umair Jamal, however, cautions that this shouldn’t be taken as a sign of a broader rapprochement—the wounds of the February crisis remain raw on both sides.
For India, China’s decision to once again place a technical hold on Jaish-e-Mohammed leader Masood Azhar’s designation as a United Nations Security Council resolution 1267 “global terrorist” has added a particular sting. As The Diplomat’s Bonnie Girard argued, this represented a double standard of sorts given China’s neuralgia about terrorism within its own borders. (All 14 other members of the Security Council favored India’s motion to have Azhar listed this time.)
Much about the February 2019 crisis between India and Pakistan remains mired in mystery. Given the broad spread of disinformation from the national media of both countries during the crisis, a lot of was left ambiguous. However, recent reported stories are making interesting new revelations. For instance, Reuters reported—with a broad range of sources—that both sides had been ready to use conventional ballistic missiles in major strikes; that would have represented massive escalation. Separately, we have some insight into naval escalation dynamics, as the Indian Navy released a statement noting that it flushed out INS Vikramaditya, its sole operational carrier, and “scores of other ships, submarines, and aircraft.” Satellite imagery from during the crisis shows that the Pakistan Navy was also flushed out to sea, raising the prospect of naval escalation as well.
In the coming weeks and months, we’ll learn how close to an all-out conflict the two South Asian neighbors really came last month, but for now, the details are still fuzzy. At least further escalation does not appear to be on the table as India looks at polls opening in less than a month.
In Case You Missed It: Rajeev Bhattacharyya reports for The Diplomat from the Indian northeast about how the Indian Army is moving to check cross-border activity by refugees and rebels alike from Myanmar.
Bottom Line: Further escalation between India and Pakistan does not appear to be in the cards for now.
Don’t Miss It: Some 900 million voting-eligible Indians will head to the polls over nearly five weeks in April and May. India has released its official 2019 general elections schedule.
Southeast Asia.
Thai citizens are set to vote in a pivotal election on March 24, but later this year, there’s another important democratic exercise just across the South China Sea in the Philippines. (We’ll return to the Thai elections in the next issue of this newsletter, once the outcomes are known.) On May 13, Philippine citizens will be able to vote in the country’s mid-term legislative, provincial, municipal, and city elections. They will come halfway into President Rodrigo Duterte’s single, six-year, non-renewable presidential term and have been widely framed as a referendum on the controversial president.
The stakes for Duterte and his plans for possible constitutional reform, particularly in the Senate, were outlined in a recent article at The Diplomat by Joshua Jervis:
A lead promise in his 2016 presidential campaign was constitutional change, designed to transition the Philippines from a centralized “Imperial Manila” model, to a federalized system of governance. Achieving this agenda has been more difficult in reality. To change the constitution, at least three-quarters of the bi-cameral Congress must support the proposal; within the Senate, this means 18 of the 24 senators must agree with the reforms. There is currently little appetite for constitutional reform, particularly given the low level of support Duterte enjoys in the upper house. Even if Duterte did manage to get the requisite numbers, the legislation would then have to obtain a majority in a national referendum. As such, rallying support and ushering in allied candidates into the Senate will prove crucial in his aim of constitutional reform.
Duterte remains broadly popular, but the upcoming elections may mark the beginning of the trend that previous Philippine presidents have seen, with declining popularity—or major scandal—in the second half of their terms. Certainly, Duterte’s management of the economy and his extrajudicial ‘drug war’ have done little to displace him.
For More: Listen to a podcast recorded late last year on the stakes in the Philippine elections—and what to look for in four other major elections expected this year.
Bottom Line: The upcoming Philippines elections will be a referendum on President Duterte’s leadership and shift the national political field.
Don’t Miss It: Last time, I covered the United States’ important assurance to Manila regarding the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty between the two countries. Prashanth Parameswaran and I discussed that assurance and more in our most recent podcast.
Central Asia.
Big—but inevitable—news broke out of Central Asia on March 19: Nursultan Nazarbayev, to date Kazakhstan’s sole post-Soviet leader, is stepping back from the presidency. Nazarbayev delivered an address to the Kazakh people explaining his decision to step down, which he described as “difficult.”
The Diplomat’s Central Asia expert Catherine Putz explains that Nazarbayev isn’t resigning the presidency for a life of obscure retirement. He’ll remain the man behind the curtain so to speak until he shuffles off this mortal coil: He “remains head of the country’s Security Council, and will for life given a law passed in May. Nazarbayev said he will also remain head of his party, Nur Otan.” Importantly, Nazarbayev will retain his title of “leader of the nation.”
Dmitri Trenin of Carnegie Moscow compares Nazarbayev’s move as in the vein of Lee Kuan Yew (note: it was “minister mentor” in Lee’s case):
Who will succeed Nazarbayev? It’s anyone’s guess at this point, but informed Central Asia analysts, including Putz, have an educated guess of what a list of possible successors might look like:
As Nazarbayev, now 78, has aged, regional analysts occasionally speculated about who would succeed him. [Interim President] Tokayev often tops those lists, but we’ll have to see how the impending presidential elections shape up. Given the sorry state of non-pro-Nazarbayev politics in Kazakhstan, the range of options is limited to an elite circle already near the top.
In a prescient bit of analysis, Natalie Hall wrote for The Diplomat last autumn about Nazarbayev’s likely successors. She writes of Tokayev:
Near the top of many analysts’ lists of possible Nazarbayev successors is Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the current chairman of the Senate, second only in power to Nazarbayev himself. Tokayev would technically become president in the event that Nazarbayev dies in office, or is deemed unfit to rule. Given the careful way in which Nazarbayev has guided the country thus far, it is possible that he will try to orchestrate a more peaceful transition via elections. Should he opt not to, or die suddenly, however, Tokayev would be the next in line for the presidency, at least in the interim.
Tokayev himself, apart from prime positioning within the Kazakh government, isn’t an unqualified leader. He started serving on Nazarbayev’s cabinet in 1992, and has an impressive resume of government service both domestically and abroad. However, where Tokayev may fall short is domestic policymaking. He lacks experience in implementing Kazakh domestic policy initiatives and that may call his long-term leadership potential into question. Moreover, he is a man of Nazarbayev’s generation. At 65, Tokayev does not offer much hope of a long presidency.
Either way, March 20—the day his resignation takes effect—marks the beginning of an important period of transition in Kazakhstan. Tokayev has officially been sworn in as interim president and Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, Dariga, a member of the Kazakh Senate, has been sworn in as the body’s speaker. Nazarbayev won’t be president, but he’s decided to manage this power transition as best as he can while he lives. And his successor, Tokayev, has already pushed through parliament a measure to rename Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital, Nursultan— ensuring that none will forget who is really at the top.
Bottom Line: In a shock decision, Nursultan Nazarbayev resigned the Kazakh presidency, setting in place a transition.
Asia Defense.
For the first time, reports have given us more clarity than ever before into the United States’ plans for a world without the restrictions of the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. To review, that treaty barred the United States and the Soviet Union—and its successor states—from possessing, developing, or testing conventional and nuclear-capable ground-launched cruise or ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 km and 5,500 km indefinitely anywhere on earth. After years of U.S. accusations that Russia unilaterally violated the treaty by developing a new cruise missile, the Trump administration formally notified Moscow on February 2 this year that it would initiate the six-month withdrawal process provided for in the treaty.
U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will elicit groans in Europe, where the prospect of 1980s-style brinkmanship and instability is an all-too-recent memory, but it has the U.S. Department of Defense—and particularly U.S. Indo-Pacific Command—excited. INDOPACOM has for years seen a need for the capabilities proscribed by the INF Treaty to complicate Chinese military planning in the Pacific and now it appears that the U.S. will develop exactly those capabilities. It’s worth underscoring that none of the new post-INF capabilities will be nuclear-capable.
The United States will begin testing two weapons—both armed solely with a conventional payload. The tests are expected to take place in or after August. One project was described by Pentagon officials who spoke to reporters as a “low-flying cruise missile with a potential range of about 1,000 kilometers.” The second missile would be a “a ballistic missile with a range of roughly 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers.”
The cruise missile may be ready for deployment as soon as early 2021, according to the existing timetable. The ballistic missile, however, is likely to take longer. It may be tested as soon as November 2019, but would likely not see deployment for five years after that. Both systems would likely be deployed with the U.S. Army. The new ballistic missile—a conventional intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM)—may see deployment on the U.S. territory of Guam. With a range capability of 4,000 kilometers, it would be able to hold at risk targets in eastern mainland China and the South China Sea.
Bottom Line: Welcome to a post-INF Treaty world. New U.S. missiles will complicate Chinese military planning for an Indo-Pacific war.
Extras.
Bakhti Nishanov of IRI Global offers some context for Nazarbayev’s resignation.
Please do feel free to reach out with comments, tips, and feedback at ankit@thediplomat.com and follow me on Twitter at @nktpnd and The Diplomat at @Diplomat_APAC.