An Attack in Kashmir Rattles India
Maldives counts its debts; Thailand’s elections; Turkey speaks up on Uyghurs
The Big One.
How will India respond to the deadliest militant strike in Kashmir in decades?
On February 14, as many as 40 Indian Central Reserve Police Force (CPRF) personnel were killed when a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) collided with a bus that was part of a convoy. The attack took place well on the Indian side of the Line of Control that separates Pakistan-administered Kashmir from the Indian-administered side, in the district of Pulwama some 40 km from Srinagar, the state capital of Jammu and Kashmir. The attack is the worst single militant strike against Indian forces in Kashmir in three decades. Pakistan-based group Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a designated terrorist group by the United States, the European Union, and India, claimed the attack and released a video featuring the alleged driver of the VBIED.
I’m writing this hours after the attack and it’s likely that things will move quickly in the next 48 hours or so, but a few initial takeaways:
This is the first time JeM—or a similar Pakistan-based militant outfit—has managed to use a VBIED against Indian forces. Previous attacks—including the 2016 Uri and Pathankot attacks—featured attackers armed with small arms and explosives like grenades.
The attack comes with just weeks to go before India’s general elections. JeM has put Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in a position where some sort of Indian retaliation is almost assured. Modi has emphasized his national security credentials to a nationalist base that will expect action beyond the so-called “surgical strikes” that followed the Uri attack, commensurate with the severity of this latest attack.
Overall, I don’t expect India to exercise the same level of restraint as in the past, but we will still see strategic restraint. India is unlikely to deploy manned aerial assets, for instance, to strike at positions across the Line of Control.
The exact nature of Indian retaliation will be determined soon enough; the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security will meet Friday morning to likely determine a course of action. Artillery and limited cross-border strikes by Indian infantry are probable; the Pakistan military is no doubt on high alert for any retaliatory action.
The Modi government’s reaction to acute cross-border subconventional action by Pakistan-backed groups has been severely politicized in recent years (Uri, Pathankot, and, before that, Gurdaspur). The reaction to the Pulwama attack will likely follow that pattern.
Possible spillover events stemming from this attack include a dampening effect on the upcoming U.S.-Taliban talks that Pakistan is scheduled to host over the weekend. Pakistan’s support for militant groups like JeM will be back in the spotlight.
The broader trend in Kashmir since the summer of 2016 will likely hold. Expect to see a short-term crackdown by Indian forces against the local population as the circumstances of the latest JeM attack are investigated.
Bottom Line: The attack against Indian forces in Pulwama is a serious incident that is likely to result in Indian military retaliation against militant targets across the Line of Control.
East Asia.
On February 9, the government of Turkey took the remarkable step of issuing a strongly worded statement denouncing China for its treatment of the Uyghur minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where as many as—and perhaps more than— 1 million Uyghur, Kazakhs, and other Turkic Muslim minority citizens of China have been sent to reeducation camps. The Turkish statement condemned China for “violating the fundamental human rights of Uyghur Turks and other Muslim communities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.” It is notable for being the first statement of its kind from a major Muslim-majority country since the extent of China’s camp system in Xinjiang became known to the outside world beginning in 2017. Read the full Turkish statement here.
At The Diplomat, Shannon Tiezzi traces the most interesting question around the Turkish statement, which is why it comes now of all times. She zeroes in on the case of Abdurehim Heyit, a well-known Uyghur musician, especially in Turkey. Heyit was caught up in China’s reeducation dragnet and was rumored to have died in state custody. China not only pushed back on Turkey’s statement—which cited Heyit by name—but also released a strange video that showed a man that it claimed was Heyit to be alive and well. Tiezzi chronicles the events:
Rumors of Heyit’s death in detention began circulating on social media on February 8, and were picked up by Turkish media. On February 9, the Turkish Foreign Ministry responded with its strongly-worded statement.
China’s authorities then released a video purporting to show Heyit alive. In the video, provided by China Radio International’s Turkish service, complete with English subtitles, a man identifies himself as Heyit, gives the date as February 10, 2019, and says he is being investigated for “allegedly violating the national laws.” He further claims to be “in good health” and to have “never been abused.” The video, reminiscent of forced confessions from other high-profile figures detained in China, has been called into question by Uyghur activists.
There are many questions going forward now. The first is where this spat between Ankara and Beijing goes from here. Turkey is an important Chinese economic partner and a participant in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. A strategic decision by China to deter other Muslim-majority countries from speaking up on the cause of the Uyghurs by punishing Turkey could get ugly quickly for Ankara. Separately, Beijing may calculate that Turkey—because of its unique diasporic relationship with Xinjiang’s Uyghurs—is uniquely positioned. The incident may bubble away slowly instead. We considered some of the probable scenarios on the latest podcast, which you can listen to here.
Bottom Line: A remarkable statement from Turkey on China’s treatment of its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang may mark the start of a major diplomatic spat between the two countries.
South Asia.
The election results in the Maldives in September 2018 were tailor-made for a simple geopolitical narrative: Ibrahim “Ibu” Mohamed Solih’s surprise victory as the joint opposition candidate was India’s gain and China’s loss. Under the former autocratic-leaning president, Abdulla Yameen, the Maldives not only found itself diverging from New Delhi as it cast aside democracy and the rule of law, but it took on millions in Chinese debt. In the months since the election—and in particular since the November inauguration of the new government led by Solih—the country has been working to take stock of just exactly what was done under Yameen’s tenure. The effort culminated last week in Maldivian authorities announcing charges against the former president. Yameen was charged with with grand corruption, money-laundering, and theft by Maldivian police on Wednesday evening.
A new report by the Financial Times offers some answers on the text of Maldivian outstanding debts to China—public and private. Citing data provided by the Maldivian foreign ministry, the report outlines more than $1 billion in outstanding commitments:
Over the past two months, the Maldives has been struggling to establish the full scale of its exposure to Chinese debt, most of which is in the form of sovereign guarantees on Chinese loans to companies. Finance ministry data show that these guarantees amount to $935m, on top of the $600m directly owed to Beijing by the government.
With the effort to tally now mostly concluded, the Maldivian government under Solih will have to seek more favorable terms on existing loans and guarantees directly from China. That means that—at least in the short-term—Solih won’t have a free hand to directly pull the rug out from underneath ongoing China-backed projects in the country.
Bottom Line: The Maldives becomes the latest country with a change of government that has come to regret a previous government’s role in succumbing to the allure of Chinese financing offers. Its outstanding debts appear simply too large to cope with in the short-term.
Deep Dive: I have a new long special report out on Pakistan’s relationships with Saudi Arabia and Iran, which focuses on how Islamabad has navigated the post-2015 dynamics between the two rivals. You can read it here.
Southeast Asia.
February 7 and 8 were a remarkable 48 hours in Thai politics. As I discussed in the previous edition of this newsletter, the country finally pinned down a date for a general election, nearly five years after the May 2014 coup d’etat that brought the current military junta to power. Thai voters will make their voices heard on March 24 in an election that won’t exactly usher in a new era of democracy; the military will linger on the political stage regardless of the outcome of that vote.
For a brief period, however, it a new hope presented itself to many Thai citizens from an unlikely source: the royal palace. Princess Ubolratana Mahidol, the widely popular elder sister of the currently reigning king, Maha Vajiralongkorn, was announced by the Thai Raksa Chart Party, an opposition party with loyalties to the ousted and exiled populist Thaksin clan, as its chosen candidate. For nearly a day, analysts watched with jaws agape: The princess would be immune from criticism and, should she become prime minister, she’d represent perhaps one of the only leaders that would genuinely be able to keep the military at an arm's length and pursue a populist political agenda.
These ideas quickly came crashing down. Skeptics had immediately wondered if the princess and the Thai Raksa Chart Party had acted with the assent of the king. The answer to that became clear when the king delivered a royal order that his sister’s candidacy would be “inappropriate” for traditional and constitutional reasons that prohibit the monarchy’s participation in electoral politics. Princess Ubolratana withdrew her registration as a candidate, respecting the king’s wishes. The military—certainly incumbent Prime Minister and former coup-leader Prayut Chan-o-cha—had a moment of relief.
While expectations are now back to where they were in early February, the incident underscores the complex dynamics that remain at the center of Thai politics between Thaksin supporters, the crown, and the military. The current king took over after his father’s death in 2016 and is seen as largely on the side of the military, but both he and his sister have been courted by Thaksin allies for a while too. Whatever the case, questions continue to linger about the nature of the relationship today between these three groups at the center of Thai politics as general elections loom.
Bottom Line: Thailand’s Princess Ubolratana won’t be running for the prime ministership on March 24, but her brief candidacy raises questions that cut to the core of Thai politics.
Central Asia.
A recent interview by Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov with the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung has drawn some interest. In that conversation, Kamilov spoke of the country’s experience during the reign of Islam Karimov, the iron-fisted autocratic ruler who died in late-2016, giving way to his reform-minded successor and then-number-two, Shavkat Mirziyoyev. (The interview took place during the January visit by MIrziyoyev to Germany, which Catherine Putz covered here.) The Diplomat’s Umida Hashimova wrote about Kamilov’s conversation, which sheds broader light on how the current government sees the ongoing reform project. “Many ask how long these reforms will last, and whether there are risks of a backward step. There is no way back,” Kamilov told the interviewer. Hashimova continues:
Kamilov assured his interviewer that Mirziyoyev will not be following China’s path of greater freedom in economic activities in exchange for less freedom in political life. Kamilov specifically stated that Uzbekistan is not China and that reforms are planned far beyond some domestic interests. Kamilov also indicated that in contrast to Karimov’s supposed policy of prioritizing economic developments ahead of anything else (Karimov’s favorite quote was “first economy, then politics”), Mirziyoyev has adopted the policy of prioritizing social, political, and economic reforms simultaneously.
The line on their being “no way back” has its origins with the current president: “Kamilov’s pithy “There is no way back” is, in fact, Mirziyoyev’s line. The president repeatedly brings it up in front of his officials as if to hammer in the idea that bridges back were burnt.”
Bottom Line: Uzbekistan’s reformist current government is eager to tell the world that it won’t be regressing as reforms continue.
Reading the Tea Leaves: Catherine Putz takes a closer look at recent government personnel changes in the region and what they do—and don’t—mean.
Asia Defense.
Let’s revisit military aviation in India this week. It’s a well-known fact that the Indian Air Force is woefully short of its required fighters; it has been short for years now and likely will be for years ahead. On the political front, with a general election now weeks away, the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is being taken to task in the local press over the terms of the 2015 government-to-government deal between India and France for the purchase of 36 Dassault Aviation Rafale multi-role fighters in fly-away condition. That deal substituted the older Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) process, which had once been called the “mother of all defense deals.” The thrust of the scandal is that the new deal is less favorable to India on both price and delivery schedule—with the opposition making the claim then that the Modi government engaged in corrupt practices to find the deal worth concluding. A good summary of the scandal is available here. Either way, things took a turn for the worse for the Modi government this week when The Hindu, a major Indian newspaper, got its hands on the eight-page dissent memo on the deal submitted by the Indian negotiating team submitted to the Deputy Chief of Air Staff. What happens next isn’t clear, but it appears likely that the Rafale scandal will remain among the top stories on the Indian airwaves as more than 800 million around the country prepare to cast their ballots.
Elsewhere in the Indian military aviation world, opportunity may present itself. My colleague Franz-Stefan Gady discussed recent reports that the United Kingdom may invited India to collaborate in the development of a so-called sixth-generation fighter under the recently unveiled Tempest Future Fighter Aircraft project. The future of this entire endeavor lingers as a major question mark for the UK—especially in the aftermath of Brexit—but the idea of inviting India appears to be a serious one at this point. (Of course, London might consult with Moscow regarding its experience in joint development with India under the aegis of the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft program.)
It’s far from clear how the Indian Air Force will decide to cope with its short-term fighter requirements. The indigenously developed Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Mark-I falls short of the Indian Air Force’s requirements. One solution might be to simply given in to desperation and have Russia sell and modernize a small batch of Cold War-era MiG-29 Fulcrums. Whatever the answer, the Indian Air Force is in trouble.
Bottom Line: The Indian Air Force remains in trouble as the scandal over a 2015 defense deal for 36 French Rafale aircraft heats up considerably in India.
Deal-Making: France’s DCNS won Australia’s competition for the Collins-class replacement submarine and, this week, the two governments finally concluded a strategic partnership agreement for the production of 12 Shortfin Barracuda-class attack submarines in what will be a AU$50 billion contract.
Don’t Miss It: Abraham Ait took a look at the future of China’s J-20 air superiority fighter. “The J-20 is likely to represent the first fifth generation air superiority fighter modified for a strike and electronic warfare role, with the American F-22 Raptor program terminated prematurely and the derivative FB-22 strike fighter program cancelled entirely.”
New Milestones: Staying on the aviation theme this week, the F-35, the short take-off/vertical landing variant of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, crossed an important milestone. F-35s off the deck of USS Wasp conducted guided bomb exercises in the Philippine and East China Sea. Meanwhile, Robert Farley wonders if the F-35B might yet have a fighting chance on board Australia’s Canberra-class warships.
Extras.
If you missed it, here are a few difficult-to-categorize recent features at The Diplomat worth your time.
First, Maarten Elferink and Florian Schierhorn take a look at the promise of Siberian agriculture in Asia, where food demand is expected to rise as populations balloon in South and Southeast Asia.
Second, with Indian elections around the corner, Krzysztof Iwanek takes a look at the possible coalitions of regional parties that might put up enough of a challenge to the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party to displace it in New Delhi.
Finally, the next time this newsletter goes out, we’ll likely have a Trump-Kim summit underway in Hanoi, Vietnam. Viet Phuong Nguyen looks at why the Vietnamese capital was chosen as the location for the second iteration of ongoing historic U.S.-North Korea diplomatic process.
Please do feel free to reach out with comments, tips, and feedback at ankit@thediplomat.com and follow me on Twitter at @nktpnd and The Diplomat at @Diplomat_APAC.